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THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT:
DOES IT COVER CUSTODY DISPUTES AMONG
EXTENDED FAMILY MEMBERS?
I. INTRODUCTION
A.B.M. v. M.H. I involved an adoption dispute between a child's
biological mother and members of the child's extended family.
2
Since family members were the only parties in the proceeding, the
prospective adoptive parents maintained that the proceeding was not
within the ambit of the Indian Child Welfare Act (the Act).3 The
Supreme Court of Alaska rejected this argument on the grounds that
the Act did not expressly or implicitly except adoption proceedings
involving only members of the extended family from its coverage.
The court's construction of the Act in A.B.M. v. M.- directly
conflicts with the Montana Supreme Court's construction in In re
Bertelson. 4 The Montana case involved a custody dispute between a
child's mother and paternal grandparents. The court held that the
Act was inapplicable to a dispute among members of the same ex-
tended family because "[tihe Act is not directed at disputes between
Indian families regarding custody of Indian children; rather, its in-
tent is to preserve Indian culture [sic] values under circumstances in
which an Indian child is placed in a foster home or other protective
institution.' 5 In A.B.M. v. M.H., the Alaska Supreme Court flatly
rejected the Montana court's analysis.6 The Montana analysis, how-
ever, more closely follows traditional rules of statutory construction.
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1. 651 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1893 (1983).
2. The Indian Child Welfare Act defines an "extended family member" for
purposes of the Act as follows:
"extended family member" shall be as defined by the law or custom of the
Indian child's tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, shall be a
person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child's
grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-
law, mece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.
Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) (Supp. V 1981).
3. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (Supp. V 1981).
4. - Mont. _, 617 P.2d 121 (1980).
5. Id at _.._, 617 P.2d at 125.
6. 651 P.2d at 1173 n.6.
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This note will apply traditional rules of statutory construction to
the Indian Child Welfare Act. It will argue that the Alaska Supreme
Court should have found that the Act exempts from its coverage cus-
tody disputes among extended family members. Finally, the impli-
cations of the court's decision will be analyzed in light of the United
States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari.
II. FACTS
A.B.M. gave birth to R.H. on February 16, 1980. Prior to the
birth, A.B.M. arranged to have the child adopted by her sister and
brother-in-law, the H.'s. On April 9, 1980, a master held the volun-
tary termination of rights hearing required by the Act.7 At this hear-
ing, the master advised A.B.M. that under the terms of the Act, she
could revoke her consent to the adoption at any time before the su-
perior court entered the final adoption decree.8 The superior court
entered R.H.'s final adoption decree on September 5, 1980. A.B.M.
made no attempt to revoke her consent prior to this final order.
In November 1980, the State Department of Health and Social
Services, Division of Family and Youth Services (the Department),
discovered that the H.'s had failed to notify it of R.H.'s adoption
proceeding as required by Alaska law.9 Accordingly, the Depart-
ment had no opportunity to investigate the suitability of R.H.'s pro-
spective home prior to the final adoption decree. As a result of this
shortcoming in the adoption proceeding, the superior court vacated
its decree. At this point A.B.M., as permitted by the Act,'0 formally
petitioned the court for custody of R.H.
In June 1981, the superior court conducted hearings to deter-
mine the future custody of R.H. A.B.M. filed a motion for summary
judgment to establish that the Act controlled the outcome of the cus-
tody suit. The court denied this motion and applied state law to the
custody issue. Concluding that the interests of R.H. would best be
served by granting the adoption by the H.'s, the court denied
A.B.M.'s petition to withdraw her consent.
7. See 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1982).
8. See i § 1913(c).
9. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.100(a) (Supp. 1983) (originally enacted as ALASKA
STAT. § 20.15.100(a)) provides in pertinent part that:
After filing of a petition to adopt a minor, the court shall fix a time and
place for hearing the petition. At least 20 days before the date of the hear-
ing, notice of the filing of the petition and of the time and place of hearing
shall be given by the petitioner to (1) the department, unless the adoption
is by a stepparent of the child. . . . The notice to the department shall be
accompanied by a copy of the petition.
10. See 25 U.S.C. § 1916(a) (Supp. V 1981).
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On appeal, A.B.M. argued that the Act entitled R.H., as an In-
dian child, to "the procedural safeguards accorded Indian chil-
dren."" The H.'s countered that the Act did not control the outcome
of the case because Congress had not intended the Act to apply to
disputes between the parents and other members of an extended
family. They submitted instead that the Act sought only to regulate
the "removal of Indian children from their families."' 2 Since the in-
stant case concerned a "voluntary placement within the family," 3
the H.'s argued that the Act was inapplicable. The supreme court
rejected this argument and awarded A.B.M. custody.
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
To reach this result, the supreme court employed two lines of
analysis. The court first noted that the Act specifically excludes from
its coverage custody disputes resulting from divorce proceedings be-
tween parents, and the placement of Indian children resulting from
juvenile delinquency actions.' 4 The court reasoned that since the
Act does not expressly exclude disputes between parents and mem-
bers of the extended family, Congress must have intended the Act to
cover these disputes. The court found "no compelling basis for im-
plying" 5 exceptions other than those enumerated.
In a second line of reasoning, not clearly articulated in the opin-
ion, the court considered the possibility of an implied exception to
the Act's coverage for disputes involving members of the child's fam-
ily.' 6 The H.'s argued that such an exception should be implied from
the Act's purpose to regulate only the "removal of Indian children
from their families."' 7 Assuming that such an exception existed, the
court then considered whether the H.'s case would come within it.
Although the exception would seemingly exclude all disputes among
family members from the Act's coverage, the court found no lan-
guage in the Act or in the legislative history to indicate that Congress
intended the definition of "family" to include extended family mem-
bers.' 8 In fact, the court maintained that Congress purposefully dis-
tinguished between "family" and "extended family members" when
11. 651 P.2d at 1172.
12. Id
13. Id at 1173.
14. Id The Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(i), (iv) (Supp. V 1981) provides: "[The term
'adoptive placement'] shall not include a placement based upon an act which, if
committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an award, in a divorce
proceeding, of custody, to one of the parents."
15. 651 P.2d at 1173.
16. Id
17. Id; see 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (Supp. V 1981).
18. 651 P.2d at 1173.
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it expressly defined "extended family member" for purposes of the
Act.' 9 Based on this analysis, the court defined the word "family" by
its most common meaning: parents and children. This construction
of "family" led the court to reject the H.'s contention that the Act
was inapplicable to their proceeding. The court reasoned that re-
moving R.H. from the H.'s custody by allowing A.B.M. to withdraw
her consent would not constitute a removal from her "family."
Rather, the removal would reunite her with her "family."20
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The court's first line of analysis2' was based on the general rule
of statutory construction that when a statute provides for stated ex-
ceptions, a court should not imply others. 22 Although this rule is
widely accepted,2 3 it is also widely accepted that a court should
not follow this rule if the result conflicts with the statute's underly-
ing purpose,24 or leads to injustice, oppression, or absurd
19. Id For the definition of an "extended family member," see supra note 2.
20. The court explained its decision as follows:
[The H.'s] submit that the Act does not apply to the instant case as it in-
stead concerns a voluntary placement within the family. This reasoning is
faulty, however, since it improperly assumes that the terms "family" and
"extended family" are congruent. We find no language in the Act or its
legislative history to indicate that Congress accorded the word "family"
anything more than its most common meaning. We are hesitant to con-
clude that Congress intended that the Act only apply when a child was
being removed from his or her extended family in the absence of explicit
language to that effect.
651 P.2d at 1173.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
22. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Sullivan, 56 Wash. 2d 251, 258, 352 P.2d
193, 197 (1960).
23. See, e.g., Hafling v. Inlandboatman's Union of Pac., 585 P.2d 870, 875
(Alaska 1978); In re Babcock, 387 P.2d 694, 696 (Alaska 1963); Mid-South Chem.
Corp. v. Carpentier, 14 Ill. 2d 514, 519, 153 N.E.2d 72, 74 (1958); State ex rel Read
v. Farmers' Irrigation Dist., 116 Neb. 373, 378, 217 N.W. 607, 609-10 (1928); In re
Monks Club, Inc., 64 Wash. 2d 845, 849, 394 P.2d 804, 807 (1964); Insurance Co. of
N. Am. v. Sullivan, 56 Wash. 2d 251, 258, 352 P.2d 193, 197 (1960); Sandona v. City
of Cle Elum, 37 Wash. 2d 831, 837, 226 P.2d 889, 892 (1951).
24. For example, although the court in Hafling v. Inlandboatsman's Union of
Pac., 585 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1978), adopted the general rule, it did not follow it
blindly. Rather, the court followed the rule of statutory construction that all statutes
relating to the same subject matter be read together as a whole so that a total scheme
evolves. Id at 878. In effect, the court achieved its desired result without violating
the underlying purpose of the implied exception rule. Also, the court in In re
Babcock held that a "proviso should be interpreted consistently with the legislative
intent" unless a court can ascertain the legislative intent only by construing the pro-
viso itself. 387 P.2d 694, 696 (Alaska 1963). See Greek-American Produce Co. v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 4 Ala. App. 377, 381, 58 So. 994, 995 (1912) ("Any other con-
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consequences. 25
It is obvious that the administration of justice requires something
more than the mere application of the letter of the law, designed
for some particular class of ordinary cases, to all others, however
modified by accident or withdrawn by extraordinary circum-
stances from the spirit of its enactment. It follows that general
terms should be limited in their application as not to lead to injus-
tice, oppression or an absurd consequence. It will always, there-
fore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its
language which would avoid results of this character. The reason
of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.2 6
When ascertaining whether it should imply an exception, a
court must bear in mind the fundamental premise of traditional stat-
utory construction that the legislature intends to incorporate a defi-
nite purpose in every enactment.2 7 A court's primary objective in
analyzing a statute is to ascertain and implement that legislative in-
tent.28 A court should imply an exception if one is needed to further
this intent.29
The starting place for a court in analyzing whether it must im-
ply an exception to the body of the statute is the statutory language
itself30 When the language of the statute is unclear, confusing, in-
consistent, contradictory, or otherwise does not reveal the legislative
intent, proper rules of statutory construction direct a court to the leg-
struction of the statute would lead to the most absurd consequences, [and] defeat the
obvious purposes of the legislature in calling it into existence.").
25. State v. Standard Oil Co., 188 La. 978, 1054, 178 So. 601, 626 (1937) (reh'g
denied) (per curiam) (1938); accord, In re Alteration of Lines, 171 Pa. Super. 642,
647, 92 A.2d 241, 243 (1952).
26. Null v. Staiger, 333 Pa. 370, 375-76, 4 A.2d 882, 885 (1939).
27. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRuCTION § 46.05, at 57
(C. Sands 4th ed. 1973).
The United States Supreme Court recently affirmed this premise. See Watt v.
Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 n.9 (1981).
28. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); Shields v. United States,
698 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 73 (1983).
29. Read v. Farmers' Irrigation Dist., 116 Neb. 373, 378, 217 N.W. 607, 609
(1928). See, e.g., In re Monks Club, Inc., 64 Wash. 2d 845, 849, 394 P.2d 804, 807
(1964).
The United States Supreme Court recently applied a similar rule: "'[A] thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.'" United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
30. See, e.g., City & Borough of Sitka v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers
Local 1547, 653 P.2d 332, 336 (Alaska 1982) ("[A] statute itself affords the best
means of its exposition, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained from the
provisions of the statute that intent will prevail."); Mid-South Chem. Corp. v. Car-
pentier, 14 IMI. 2d 514, 518, 153 N.E.2d 72, 74 (1958).
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islative history for insight.3 ' The Alaska Supreme Court has often
acknowledged this framework for ascertaining and analyzing legisla-
tive intent.32
In determining whether the Act excludes disputes between par-
ents and members of the extended family, the Alaska Supreme
Court, therefore, should have begun by analyzing the language of
the Act:
§ 1902. Congressional declaration of policy
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Na-
tion to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the es-
tablishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of In-
dian children from their families and the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique
values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian
tribes in the operation of child and family service programs. 33
Congress reiterated this policy of protecting Indian values, cul-
ture, and heritage throughout the Act. Recently, the Kansas
Supreme Court summarized the sections of the Act which refer to
this policy:
Included in the congressional findings to support the Act is
§ 1901(4) to the effect "that an alarmingly high percentage of In-
dian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of
their children from them . . . ." Section 1911(a) provides exclu-
sive jurisdiction in the Indian tribe "over any child custody pro-
ceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled
within the reservation . . . ." Section 1912(d) provides that ef-
forts should be made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family
while subsections (e) and (f) refer to "the continued custody of the
child by the parent or Indian custodian" and the potential for
emotional or physical damage to the child. Section 1914 again
refers to the removal of the child from the parent or Indian custo-
31. See, e.g., Heppner v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 665 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir.
1981). The Supreme Court recently applied this maxim:
Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the
primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the mean-
ing of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one
of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make
a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have
some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative
discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.
Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 n.9 (1981) (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d
737, 739 (2d Cir.), aft'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)).
32. "Although the starting point in construing a statute is the language of the
statute itself, reference to the legislative history may provide insight that is helpful
in determining the statute's meaning." City & Borough of Sitka v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1547, 653 P.2d 332, 336 (Alaska 1982); see also North
Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Corp., 585 P.2d 534, 540 (Alaska 1978).
33. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (Supp. V 1981).
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dian. Sections 1916(b), 1920 and 1922 also reflect the underlying
thread that runs throughout the entire Act to the effect that the Act
is concerned with the removal of Indian children from an existing
Indian family unit and the resultant breakup of the Indian
family.34
However, the language of the Act does not expressly address the
question whether the Act controls the outcome of disputes within a
child's extended family. Given the uncertainty created by this omis-
sion, the Alaska Supreme Court should have been directed, under
proper rules of statutory construction, to the legislative history of the
Act.
The Act's inception dates back to the early 1970's, when the ero-
sion of Indian family life received extensive publicity.35 Perhaps due
to this nationwide exposure, congressional committees started inves-
tigating the problem. During its hearings in 1974, Congress found
that state adoption officials showed insufficient deference to Indian
cultural values and social norms.36 This lack of deference had re-
sulted in many unwarranted Indian child custody placements. Ex-
perts testified that these unwarranted placements formed a "pattern
of discrimination against American Indians. ' 37 They argued that
adoption officials routinely failed to note that in "many Indian tribes
the extended family, rather than the nuclear family, [was] the norm;
child care [was] traditionally the responsibility of grandparents or
other relatives. ' 38 Adoption officials often misinterpreted this norm
34. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 206, 643 P.2d 168, 175 (1982).
35. For example, see McDowell, The Indian Adoption Problem, Wall St. J., July
12, 1974, § 1, at 6, col. 3: "Indian parents and officials all across the U.S. are pro-
testing what they describe as cultural or legal 'genocide' inflicted by county, state
and federal agencies that sanction or participate in the wholesale removal of Indian
children from their homes and reservations."
36. See Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3
(1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings] (defining the specific problems that
American Indian families face in raising their children and how these problems are
affected by federal action) (opening statement of Sen. James Abourezk of South
Dakota); see also In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 130 Ariz. 202, 203,
635 P.2d 187, 188 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
The House report reiterated these findings. "In judging the fitness of a particu-
lar family, many social workers, ignorant of Indian cultural values and social
norms, [made] decisions that [were] wholly inappropriate in the context of Indian
family life." H. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7530, 7532.
37. 1974 Hearings, supra note 36, at 2. See generally Comment, The Indian
Child Welfare Act - Tribal Self-Determination Through Participation in Child Cus-
tody Proceedings, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 1202 (discussing the various practices which
resulted in the discrimination).
38. Comment, supra note 37, at 1203.
In American Indian society, the role of the extended family is essentially
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
as parental neglect.39 As a result, for decades the states removed a
disproportionate number of Indian children from their homes and
placed them in non-Indian homes.40
Experts further testified that the removal of American Indian
children from their families destroyed the Indian family and its way
of life. By depriving these children of their tribal and cultural heri-
tage,41 the states paralyzed the ability of the tribes to perpetuate
themselves.4 2 This was "the most severe [method] of undermining
retained tribal sovereignty and autonomy. '43 Furthermore, these
discriminatory removals had serious long-term, as well as short-term
emotional effects on the removed children. 4
These findings inspired Congress to enact the Indian Child Wel-
equivalent to that of a "parent" in white society. Comment, The American Indian
Child- Welfare Crisis Cultural Genocide or First Amendment Preservation, 7 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 529, 536 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Cultural Geno-
cide].
"An Indian child may have scores of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives
who are counted as close, responsible members of the family." H. REP. No. 1386,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 10, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7530,
7532.
39. H. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7530, 7532.
40. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 36, at 1. A 1977 Joint Committee report
stated, for example:
There are 28,334 Alaskan Natives under 21. Of these, 957 (or 1 out of
every 29.6) Alaskan Native children has been adopted; 93 percent of these
were adopted by non-Native families. The adoption rate for non-Native
children is 1 out of 134.7. By proportion, there are 4.6 times (460 percent)
as many Native children in adoptive homes as there are non-Native
children.
TASK FORCE FOUR OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, 94TH
CONG., 2D SEss., FINAL REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE & TRIBAL JURISDICTION 81
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 REPORT].
41. Comment, supra note 37, at 1202.
42. 1976 REPORT, supra note 40, at 86.
43. Id
44. The Indian Policy Review Commission reported:
[The individual child removed from his/her home environment. . . may
suffer untold social and psychological consequences. Louis La Rose,
chairman of the Winnebago Tribe, expressed the anger of many when
commenting on the debacle of the Indian child placement situation:
"I think the cruelest trick that the white man has ever done to Indian
children is to take them into adoption courts, erase all of their records
and send them off to some nebulous family that has a value system
that is A-1 in the [state] and that child reaches 16 or 17, he is a little
brown child residing in a white community and he goes back to the
reservation and he has absolutely no idea who his relatives are, and
they effectively make him a non-person and I think. . . they destroy
him. And if you have ever talked to an individual like that when he
comes to a reservation ... I get depressed."
1976 REPORT, supra note 40, at 78.
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fare Act 45 in 1978. The legislative history of the Act emphasizes that
its primary purpose is to maintain Indian family and culture,46 and
to set "minimum standards for the removal of Indian children from
their existing Indian environment." 47 To accomplish its purpose,
Congress sought to impose "strict procedural limitations" on the
states' abilities to remove Indian children from their families.48 By
attempting to curb abusive state practices,49 Congress hoped to cor-
rect the discriminatory placement of Indian children in non-Indian
foster care homes and institutions.50
The Act expressly excepts from its coverage custody disputes re-
sulting from divorce proceedings between parents and the placement
of Indian children resulting from juvenile delinquency actions.51 In
considering whether it should have implied other exceptions to the
Act, the supreme court first should have decided whether the express
language of the Act, without implied exceptions, would have vio-
45. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (Supp. V 1981).
46. See 1976 REPORT, supra note 40, at 87-88; Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977:
Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 154 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings] (statement of National Tri-
bal Chairmen's Association); id at 218 (statement of Don Reeves); id at 237 (state-
ment of Alaska Legal Services Corporation).
47. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 205-06, 643 P.2d 168, 175
(1982).
48. Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Critical Analysis, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 1287, 1287 (1980); see the Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (Supp. V 1981).
49. 1976 REPORT, supra note 40, at 79.
Testimony at the congressional hearings reiterated this point: "The general in-
tent of this Bill is to establish standards for the placement of Indian children in
foster care or adoptive homes, to prevent the breakup of Indian families .... 
1977 Hearings, supra note 46, at 85 (statement of the National Congress of Ameri-
can Indians). "S. 1214 is intended to deal with the recurrent problem of forcible and
fraudulent removal of Indian children from their natural or adoptive parents, or
from the homes of blood relatives, for placement with non-Indian families or insti-
tutions .... " Id at 123 (statement of Dr. Marlene Echohawk, National Congress
of American Indians).
50. H. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7530, 7532. Section 1901 of the Act lists five of the congression-
al findings, which include the following:
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by
the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal
public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such
children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institu-
tions; and (5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over
Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial
bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of In-
dian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian
communities and families.
For an argument that these placements may be unconstitutional, see Comment, Cul-
tural Genocide, supra note 38, at 537-46.
51. 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (Supp. V 1981).
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lated the intent of Congress or led to an unjust or absurd result.5 2
Upon deciding that such a result would arise through this interpreta-
tion of the Act, the court would have been compelled to affirm the
lower court's decision to grant adoption to the H.'s under Alaska
law.
The sole purpose of the express exceptions is to exempt from the
Act's coverage certain state practices which Congress found had not
been abusive.5 3 The intrafamily adoption at issue in R.H.'s case
likewise involves no state abuse. Application of the Act to a case
which involves no abusive state practice clearly violates the intent of
Congress. Moreover, without the implication of such an exception,
the court's result is clearly unjust, given the superior court's finding
that the child's best interests would have been served by granting
adoption by the H.'s.5 4 To avoid violating the intent of Congress or
reaching an unjust result, the supreme court should have implied an
exception to the Act for intrafamily disputes.
After incorrectly determining that the Act was applicable to the
H.'s case, the court, in its second line of analysis, assumed that the
Act was inapplicable to intrafamily disputes.5  The basis for the
court's assumption was the H.'s argument that the Act's purpose was
to regulate only the "removal of Indian children from their fami-
lies."' 56 To determine whether R.H. was being removed from her
family, the court was required to interpret the breadth of the word
"family" in the Act. Finding that the Act left the word "family"
undefined, the court defined it according to its most common mean-
ing:57 parents and children. Since extended family members are not
included within this definition, the court concluded that the Act was
applicable to the dispute.
In defining the word "family" by its most common meaning, the
court again violated accepted rules of statutory construction. These
rules recognize that a legislature formulates and adopts the subsidi-
ary provisions of a statute in harmony with its general purpose.5 8
52. See supra text accompanying note 27.
53. Congress desired to regulate primarily "attempts [by the states] to remove
an Indian child from his or her home on grounds of the alleged incompetence or
brutality of the parents." In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 207, 643
P.2d 168, 176 (1982) (emphasis added) (citing Barsh, supra note 48, at 1305). The
exceptions encompass state actions which are not among these abuses.
54. See 651 P.2d at 1172.
55. Id. at 1173.
56. Id; see supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
57. 651 P.2d at 1173.
58. See 3. SUTHERLAND, supra note 27, at 57.
"A statute must receive such construction as will, if possible, make all its
parts harmonize with each other, and render them consistent with its scope
and object." Ellison v. Railroad Co., 36 Miss. 572 [(1858)]. "The entire
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All judicial constructions of specific statutory words or clauses,
therefore, must be made "with reference to the leading idea or pur-
pose of the whole instrument. '59 By according the word "family" its
most common meaning, the court failed to define the word in a man-
ner consistent with the statute's general purpose.
As stated in section 1902, the Act's general purpose is "to pro-
tect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability
and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of
minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from
their families." °60 To effectuate the purposes of the Act, a court must
define the word "family" according to Indian standards. Defining
"family" by the common "White Man's" meaning works against In-
dian cultural preservation 61 and violates the purposes of the Act.
Despite the Act's clear purposes, the Alaska Supreme Court de-
cided that Congress distinguished in the Act between family mem-
bers and extended family members when it defined "extended family
statute must be so read that the whole may have a harmonious and consis-
tent operation." Virden v. Bowers, 55 Miss. [1 (1877)]. "In the construc-
tion of a statute the object is to get at its spirit and meaning, its design and
scope; and that construction will be justified which evidently embraces the
meaning and carries out the object of the law, although it be against the
letter and the grammatical construction of the act." Dixon v. Doe, 1
Smedes & M. 70 [(1843)]; Pointer v. Trotter, 10 Smedes & M. 537 [(1848)];
Board of Education v. Mobile & O&R Co., 72 Miss., at page 239, 16 South.
489 [(1894)].
Adams v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 75 Miss. 275, 283, 22 So. 824, 826 (1897).
59. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 27, at 56.
It is always an unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to divide it by
a process of etymological dissection, and to separate words and then apply
to each, thus separated from its context, some particular definition given
by lexicographers and then reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of
these definitions. An instrument must always be construed as a whole, and
the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is usually to
be ascribed from the context, the nature of the subject matter treated of,
and the purpose or intention of the parties who executed the contract or of
the body which enacted or framed the statute or constitution.
Id (citing International Trust Co. v. American Loan & Trust Co., 62 Minn. 501,
503, 65 N.W. 78, 79 (1895)).
"Neither clinical construction nor the letter of the statute nor its rhetorical
framework should be permitted to defeat its clear and definite purpose to be gath-
ered from the whole act, compared part with part." J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 27,
at 56 (citing Adams v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 75 Miss. 275, 283, 22 So. 824, 825 (1897)).
The Supreme Court has a long history of applying this maxim. See, e.g.,
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S.
1, 11 (1962); United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850).
60. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (Supp. V 1981).
61. It is through the family (the parents and the extended family members) that
American Indian culture is maintained and developed. Guerreo, Indian Child Wel-
fare Act of 1978: A Response to the Threat to Indian Culture Caused by Foster and
Adoptive Placements of Indian Children, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 51, 76 (1979).
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member" for purposes of the Act.6 2 A logical basis for the court's
decision is the rule of statutory construction that one provision of a
statute should not be defined in a way which is internally contradic-
tory or that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent
or meaningless. 63 The court expressed concern that if it defined fam-
ily to include extended family members, it would render one of the
terms meaningless. However, defining family in such a manner, and
thus in harmony with the purposes of the Act, would not render
either term meaningless.
The Act uses three terms when referring to elements of the In-
dian family unit: parents,64 extended family member,65 and fam-
ily 66 A logical, and consistent, reading of these terms would include
the mother and father as parents and all other close relations as
members of the extended family. The family, as a combination of
both of these groups, would consist of all of the child's close rela-
tions. No terms would be rendered meaningless by such an inferpre-
tation. Furthermore, the congressional intent to protect Indian
culture would be more fully preserved and promoted.67
62. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
63. See Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th
Cir. 1981).
This rule has been applied in other Alaska cases. See Isakson v. Rickey, 550
P.2d 359, 364 (Alaska 1976) ("[E]ach section of a statute is presumed to serve some
useful purpose."); see also Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 930 (1978); Patagonia Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 517 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1975).
64. 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (Supp. V 1981) defines a parent as "any biological parent
or parents of an Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an
Indian child." The words "parent" or "parents" are used throughout the Act. See,
e.g., id § 1911(b) ("termination of parental rights;" objection or petition "by either
parent"); id § 1912(a) ("termination of parental rights," "notify the parent"); id
§ 1913 ("parental rights").
65. For a definition of extended family member, see supra note 2.
The term "extended family member" is used only in section 1915 of the Act.
This section provides that in any adoptive placement of an Indian child, first prefer-
ence shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement
with a member of the child's extended family. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Supp. V 1981).
The obvious meaning of the term in this context does not include the parents, but
only the other close relations of the child.
66. The word "family" is used three times in the Act. See 25 U.S.C. § 1902
("minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their fami-
lies"); § 1931(2) ("the operation and maintenance of facilities for the counseling and
treatment of Indian families"); § 1932 ("family assistance" and "advice to Indian
families involved in child custody proceedings").
67. The legislative history of§ 1902 supports this reading of the Act by concern-
ing itself with removal of Indian children both from their parents and their blood
relatives. See supra note 49. The use of the word "family" in § 1902 should, there-
fore, include both of these groups.
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V. DENIAL OF CERTIORARI
Proponents of the Alaska Supreme Court's position cannot
point to the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court68 as support for the Alaska Supreme Court's position. A de-
nial of certiorari "is not designed to reflect the Court's views. . . as
to the merits of the case." 69 There may be a multitude of reasons
leading to the denial of certiorari, many or all of which have no
bearing on the correctness of the Alaska Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Act.70 "A denial means merely that less than four mem-
bers of the court believed that the petition should be granted."'7'
68. 103 S. Ct. 1893 (1983).
69. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 353 (5th ed. 1978).
The Court has frequently reiterated this point. See, e.g., United States v. Carver,
260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923). For other Supreme Court cases in accord, see R. STERN &
E. GRESSMAN, at 353 n.23.
70. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 69, at 354.
71. Id
That fact, which is so often forgotten or misunderstood, was strongly
emphasized again by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in commenting upon the
Court's refusal to grant certiorari to review a case involving significant is-
sues of free speech and press:
"This Court now declines to review the decision of the Maryland
Court of Appeals. The sole significance of such denial of a petition
for writ of certiorari need not be elucidated to those versed in the
Court's procedures. It simply means that fewer than four members of
the Court deemed it desirable to review a decision of the lower court
as a matter 'of sound judicial discretion.' A variety of considerations
underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different rea-
sons may lead different Justices to the same result. This is especially
true of petitions for review on writ of certiorari to a State court. Nar-
rowly technical reasons may lead to denials. Review may be sought
too late; the judgment of the lower court may not be final; it may not
be the judgment of a State court of last resort; the decision may be
supportable as a matter of State law, not subject to review by this
Court, even though the State court also passed on issues of federal
law. A decision may satisfy all these technical requirements and yet
may commend itself for review to fewer than four members of the
Court. Pertinent considerations ofjudicial policy here come into play.
A case may raise an important question but the record may be cloudy.
It may be desirable to have different aspects of an issue further iflu-
mined by the lower courts. Wise adjudication has its own time for
ripening ....
Inasmuch, therefore, as all that a denial of a petition for a writ of
certiorari means is that fewer than four members of the Court thought
it should be granted, this Court has rigorously insisted that such a
denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court's
views on the merits of a case which it has declined to review. The
Court has said this again and again; again and again the admonition
has to be repeated.
The one thing that can be said with certainty about the Court's
denial of Maryland's petition in this case is that it does not remotely
imply approval or disapproval of what was said by the Court of
ALASKA LAW.REVIEW
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision not to consider this case should
not be regarded as an approval of Alaska's faulty statutory construc-
tion. If the Alaska Supreme Court had followed proper rules of stat-
utory construction, it would have concluded, as did Montana's high
court, that the Act was inapplicable to the H.'s proceeding under
both lines of its analysis. Under the first line, an unjust result occurs
unless intrafamily disputes are excepted. Under the second line, ex-
tended family members should be regarded by the court as an inte-
gral part of the Indian family - as they are by Indian culture. Thus,
disputes among extended family members should be excluded from
the Act's coverage because its purpose is solely to regulate the re-
moval of Indian children from their families. Only by reversing it-
self could the court respect the distinct heritage, culture, and system
of ethical values of the American Indian. It is to be hoped that this
decision does not signal the beginning of a trend in Alaska of judi-
cial disregard for the American Indian's distinctive cultural heritage
and patterns of social and family organization. The court should
respect and promote the distinct Indian culture. It should not at-
tempt to impose the norms of the dominant "White Society" on the
Indian community. The American Indians were a vital part of
Alaska's history. They should be given the opportunity to remain a
vital part of its future - especially since Congress has mandated no
less.
Jeffrey Drew Butt
Appeals of Maryland. The issues canvassed in the opinions of that
court, and which the State of Maryland has asked us to review, are of
a nature which very readily lend themselves to misconstruction of the
denial of this petition. The present instance is peculiarly one where
the redundant becomes the necessary."
Id at 354-55 (quoting Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917-20
(1949)).
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